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Militaristic societies are ones in which the armed forces enjoy a privileged 
material and cultural status, and where military priorities and frames of thinking play 
a key role in policymaking and political culture (Vagts 1981, Evans and Newnham 
1988). Militarism is not limited to direct governance by uniformed personnel 
(“praetorianism”), but may instead coexist with substantive democratic institutions 
(Ben Eliezer 1997). Thus, contemporary societies described as militaristic are as 
politically diverse as Switzerland and Burma, North and South Korea, Jordan and 
Israel.  
This chapter explores the interface between environmental and military issues 
in Israel, placing it within the context of the changing fortunes of Israeli militarism. In 
particular, it is argued that growing public willingness to challenge the military’s 
environmentally destructive behavior in the last decades was linked to wider 
transformations in Israeli society. The Oslo Accords and the rise of liberal-
individualist outlooks associated with globalization and consumer culture weakened 
the country’s founding collectivist ideology in favor of material values associated 
with quality of life. In this context, the military lost its previous immunity to public 
criticism, and environmental concerns, formerly considered luxuries in comparison 
with security matters, were able to gain ground in the public sphere alongside other 
civil agendas. 
The chapter begins by stating the case for viewing Israel as a militaristic 
society. It then surveys the military’s environmental activity and the environmental 
destruction it has wrought, while also noting some early successes in the area of 
nature conservation. Finally, it discusses how, since the 1990s, the environmental 
movement and affected residents, as well as the Ministry of Environment and State 
Comptroller, have pushed the military to clean up its act. 
 
 
The IDF and Israeli militarism 
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), commonly known in Israel by the Hebrew 
acronym TZAHAL, is a conscript army. National military service is mandatory for all 
non-Arab Israel citizens over the age of 18 (including women, as well as Druze men), 
although exceptions are made on religious, medical and mental health grounds. IDF 
service ranges from combat roles to logistics and auxiliary support, education and 
intelligence. After completing regular service of three years (two for women), the IDF 
may call up men for paid reserve duty of up to 54 days per 3 years (84 days for 
officers), until the age of 40 (45 for officers). 
Between 1950 and 1966, Israel spent on average 9% of its GDP on security. 
The figure reached a high of about 30% in the 1970s, but has since returned to under 
10%. As of 2008, Israel ranked 5th in the world in terms of military expenditure per 
GDP (7.0%), superseded by Oman (7.7%), Saudi Arabia (8.2%), Georgia (8.5%) and 
Eritrea (20.9%) and followed by Chad (6.6%), the United Arab Emirates (5.9%), 
Jordan (5.9%), Iraq (5.4%), Sudan (4.4%) and the United States (4.3%). Israel’s 
expenditure includes military aid from the United States, which in 2008 was $2.38 
billion (SIPRI 2008). In 2008, Israel spent just over $14 billion on its armed forces 
($1,926 per capita), making it the country with the largest percentage of military 
spending as part of the national budget among all developed countries. In 2009, this 
budget was further raised by an extra 1.5 billion NIS to help address perceived threats 
from Iran’s nuclear program, making it the highest total amount spent on security in 
Israel’s history. 
Israel is also among the world’s largest arms exporters. According to Israeli 
Ministry of Security figures, in 2008 Israeli industries signed $6.3 billion worth of 
security export contracts, placing the country third in world rankings after the U.S. 
and Russia (Opall 2009). U.S. government data, on the other hand, places Israel at 
10th place with $400 million of exports (Grimmet 2009). The discrepancy is possibly 
due to the American report not including services such as training and technical 
support. 
Finally, proportional to its size Israel has the world’s most extensive military 
control of land. Over one third of the 22,072 square kilometers under Israeli civilian 
law (including the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem) are directly controlled by the 
IDF – mostly as training grounds. The military also places limitations on planning and 
construction around its installations, and certain otherwise-civilian areas are 
designated for emergency use to gather forces and deploy weapons systems, enlarging 
the area controlled to almost half of the country (Oren and Regev 2008). Add the fact 
that the IDF is the sovereign in the occupied West Bank, and we find that military 
control exists over more than three quarters of the territory between the Jordan and the 
Mediterranean.  
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Fig. 1 – Military and civilian land-use (Oren and Regev 2008:11) 
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Map 1 – Training and exclusion zones (Oren and Regev 2008:199) 
 
With regard to construction and planning, the military functions as an all-but 
autonomous entity. While the law requires security installations to receive building 
permits, the procedure for acquiring them is much shorter than for civilian projects, 
and requires only specifying the project’s location and boundaries at a Committee for 
Security Installations (CSI) operating in every district (Baruchin, Oren and Regev 
2009). Moreover, Ministry of Security representatives sit on civilian Regional 
Planning and Building Committees, and may submit objections (whose substance 
need not be made public) to civilian projects that may conflict with existing or 
approved security installations. 
The realities of role expansion, budget prioritization, control of land and 
planning autonomy are the hallmarks of militarism. Nevertheless, only over the past 
decade has a critical discussion this reality emerged in earnest. 
Early Israeli scholarship on military matters took place within the structural-
functionalist paradigm of “civil-military relations” imported from American 
academia, where it had been developed in the context of the Cold War (cf. Janowitz 
1971, Huntington 1981). This framework assumes a functional differentiation in the 
modern democratic state between the civilian and military spheres, whereby the 
military is a professional service-provider to the state and does not take political 
stances as such, acting instead as yet another interest group in the competition over 
state resources. On this account, military coups in modern states are the result of a 
pathological “role expansion” of the military, whereby it increasingly encroaches on a 
weakened civilian domain. 
  Israeli social commentators, eager to number the country among western 
democracies, adopted this paradigm by and large (Perlmutter 1966, 1968; Peri 1977, 
1981; Lissak 1983, 1984). At the same time, they could not ignore the overwhelming 
evidence for the expanded role of the IDF in Israeli society. This includes the regular 
“parachuting” of recently-retired generals into senior political and managerial 
positions; the social networks among career officers and reservists that are carried 
over into civilian life; the promotion of the military by the school system, religious 
institutions, youth movements, cultural organizations and the media; and the wide 
range of civilian roles played by the IDF, especially in education and immigrant 
absorption.  
However, since no military coup had ever taken place in Israel, the 
aforementioned writers took for granted the health of civil-military relations, and 
proceeded to celebrate the IDF’s role expansion as a functional contribution to 
democracy. The “civilianization of the military” (Perlmutter 1966:102) and the partial 
militarization of the civilian sphere were explained as factors which by themselves 
mitigated the threat of praetorianism inherent to the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict. 
All the while, the conflict itself was conceived as an extrinsic factor that places a 
strain on the social system from without, rather than as constitutive of Israeli society 
itself (cf. Peled and Shafir 1996). 
This outlook has been increasingly undercut in the past two decades, as new 
scholarship has challenged previously unquestioned assumptions about the Zionist 
project and the role of the IDF (Ben Ari, Rosenhek and Maman 2001:5-9). In contrast 
to earlier accounts, current studies tend to emphasize the constitutive role of the Arab-
Israeli conflict in shaping Israeli society, and of the military in the construction of 
collective and individual identities (Ben Ari 1998, Lomsky-Feder and Ben Ari 1999).  
Central to the re-evaluation of Israeli militarism have been Uri Ben Eliezer’s 
studies (Ben Eliezer 1997, 1998, 2001), which explain the blurring of the separation 
between army and society in Israel by situating it as the latest in a series of “nations in 
arms” – along with France after the Revolution and again from 1870; Prussia from its 
defeat by Napoleon and until the First World War; and Japan in the Meiji period 
(1868-1912). In common with these countries, there has never been overt military 
rule. Instead, role expansion “is manifested in the fact that the army is not built as a 
professional force, separate from the society, but exists as the army of the whole 
nation, with the idea of participation at its center. ‘Everyone’ is involved, first as 
conscripts, and afterward in the reserves” (Ben Eliezer 2001:146-7).  
 Newer scholarship has thus stressed how the IDF functions as a central 
mechanism in constructing differential levels of inclusion and exclusion in society via 
recruitment, assignation and retention of personnel (Levy 1996, Rosenhek 1999). The 
gendered dimensions of Israeli militarism have also come under scrutiny, tying the 
military’s central social role to the reproduction of masculinist worldviews, and 
analyzing women’s service in the IDF not as an equalizing factor but rather as a 
mechanism for reproducing their subordination (Yuval Davis 1985, Jerbi 1997, Izraeli 
2001).  
 
Kimmerling (2001:215-6) argues that the ideological dimension of militarism in 
Israeli society amounts to a “civil religion of security”, whereby 
 
civilian leaders and constituencies regard primary military and strategic 
considerations as self-evidently the only or the predominant 
considerations in most of their social and political decision-
making…Once militarism penetrates the cognitive dimensions of a culture 
its suffuses both the structural and cultural state of mind of the 
collectivity…[the] institutional and cognitive orientation towards 
permanent war preparation in order to defend the collectivity’s very 
existence [becomes] part of social routine and [is] no longer considered a 
matter of public debate or political struggle.  
On such a reading, the sense of “existential threat” prevalent in Israeli society – 
the perception that the only alternative to military victory is the total annihilation of 
the society – is artificial and functions to maintain the legitimacy of militaristic 
arrangements and the depoliticization of security (Ezrahi 1997, Pappé 2002).  
As a result of these material and ideological dimensions of Israeli militarism, it 
is unsurprising that military priorities have regularly taken precedence over 
environmental ones throughout the country’s history.  We now move to assess the 
results of this precedence in terms of the military’s environmental impacts. 
The IDF and the ecology of war 
By the time Israel was founded in 1948, a variety of local mammals in 
Palestine had already been hunted to the verge of extinction due to poor enforcement 
of the British hunting laws during the mandate period. In view of the situation, a year-
long moratorium on all hunting was declared soon after the State’s founding. Once it 
was lifted, however, it became clear that the major threat to wildlife was now IDF 
soldiers, who freely shot wild animals – especially gazelles – with their rifles. In 
response, the Joint Nature Protection Committee of the Zoology and Biology 
Societies (which would later evolve into the Society for Protection of Nature in Israel) 
wrote an impassioned plea to IDF chiefs. This resulted in a 1951 general order 
prohibiting all hunting of gazelles (Tal 2002:158).  
During the 1960’s, an unlikely figure emerged from within the IDF as an early 
champion of conservation. Avraham Yoffe, an IDF General with a penchant for 
hunting, was appointed in 1965 as the first director of the Nature Reserves Authority, 
after a decade struggle by the SPNI to establish reserves. A larger-than-life figure 
with a forceful personality, Yoffe permanently gave up hunting, dedicating himself 
fully to conservation. He set out to maximize the number and size of areas designated 
as nature reserves, using his “combination of obstinacy, connections and charm” (Tal 
2002:170) – connections which were especially important in dealing with military 
counter-claims to land use. Within a decade of its founding the Authority’s team of 
inspectors had grown tenfold, and by the end of Yoffe’s tenure close to one hundred 
reserves had been declared. 
Yet these early conservation successes have been an exception that indicates 
the norm. Overall, the IDF’s environmental record has been negative and severe. 
The environmental impacts of military conflict worldwide have been studied 
extensively, especially since the tactical oil spills of the first Gulf War where wildlife 
biologists documented high seabird mortality and pollution of tide flats important for 
migratory shorebirds (Evans et al. 1993; Sadiq 1993, Austin and Bruch 2000, Hulme 
2004; Machlis and Hanson 2008). War regularly involves severe disturbances to 
habitats, uncontrolled extraction of resources, deforestation, and water contamination. 
Area-impact weapons such as napalm, cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives are 
intentionally destructive over a wide area. Bombing of urban areas causes heavy 
smoke and dust pollution, which can be toxic when factories are targeted. Unexploded 
ordinance (such as landmines and cluster bombs) continues to kill and maim humans 
and animals long after hostilities have ended.  
Such effects have been evident in Israel’s experience of conflict. Since Israel 
has never carried out an assessment of its military’s environmental impact, 
quantitative data on most of these aspects is sorely lacking. Evidence from elsewhere, 
however, indicates the likely impacts of military activities in Israel.  
While no systematic information exists regarding the impact of country's 
major wars, widespread fighting in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights during the 
1967 and 1973 wars could only have damaged the local environment. Meteorological 
research indicates that fighting in the northern Sahara during World War II, in similar 
conditions to the Sinai, led to a tenfold increase in dust storms, as fragile desert 
vegetation and soils were disturbed (Machlis and Hanson 2008). To this day, the 
Golan Heights are littered with over 2,000 minefields, including anti-personnel 
landmines which cause frequent animal and occasional human casualties (Heshmonai 
2010). On the positive side, demilitarized zones established following the ceasefires in 
the Jordan River basin and along the Syrian border serve as default nature reserves – 
although they are always vulnerable to resumed hostilities. 
After the outbreak of the Second Intifada in October 2000, Palestinians alleged 
that the IDF was deliberately damaging the environment in the West Bank. Such 
allegations included destroying trees and crops, damaging wells and water 
infrastructure, and dumping of toxic waste in Palestinian-controlled areas (Twite 
2003:567-9). Israel has argued that this damage was a direct result of violence 
initiated by the Palestinian side, and less serious than the impact of the long-term 
neglect of the environment by the Palestinian Authority.  
During the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Israeli jets bombed a power station 
south of Beirut, causing an estimated 15,000 tons of oil to spill into the Mediterranean 
Sea. The oil spread rapidly, covering 150 km of the Lebanese and Syrian coastlines, 
killing fish and affecting sensitive habitats. The clean-up campaign was delayed five 
weeks until the ceasefire, making much of the damage irreversible. Meanwhile, 
Hezbollah rockets caused major fires in Northern Israel, burning a total of 52,000 
dunams of forest to the ground (Baror 2006, UNEP 2007).  
The 2008 Gaza conflict, for its part, caused damage to wells and sewage 
systems in the Gaza Strip, further polluting its already hyper-stressed groundwater. 
According to an Amnesty International report. four water reservoirs, 11 wells, and 
sewage networks and pumping stations were damaged and 20,000 metres of water 
mains were damaged or destroyed by Israeli tanks and bulldozers. Sewage treatment 
plants in north and central Gaza were damaged, resulting in raw sewage flooding 
more than a square kilometre of agricultural and residential land, destroying crops and 
causing a health hazard (Amnesty International 2009:10). The Palestinians also 
accused Israel of using depleted uranium shells and white phosphorus during the 
operation, a charge that Israel denies. Hamas rockets, for their part, have caused fires 
in both nature reserves and agricultural fields within Israel – both before and during 
the Gaza conflict (Bereshkovsky 2006).  
A more recent set of major environmental impacts caused by military activity 
is related to the construction of the Segregation Barrier in the West Bank, which is 
spread along hundreds of kilometers and incorporates extensive physical 
infrastructure. Alongside its human cost in terms of Palestinians’ freedom of 
movement, livelihoods and dignity, the barrier also has important environmental 
impacts. According to the SPNI, this includes the fragmentation of previously 
continuous animal and plant populations or ecological corridors; direct damage to 
unique habitats; and damage to aquifers and streams anything on the disruption of 
migration routes (SPNI 2010). 
IDF activities during peacetime also have many direct environmental costs. 
Modern war preparations include significant resource consumption, stockpiling of 
strategic materials, weapons testing and training. Active training can lead to residual 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), chemical contamination, landscape cratering, 
vegetation removal and soil erosion. The military’s ecological footprint is even larger 
if we consider the inputs it requires in terms of water, fuels, food and raw materials. 
Worldwide, war preparations alone utilize up to 15 million square kilometers of land, 
account for 6% of all raw material consumption, and produce as much as 10% of 
global carbon emissions annually (Machlis and Hanson 2008).  
In Israel, everyday training activities take a serious toll on the landscape. 
Examples cited in the State Comptroller’s report (2004) include the construction of 
training infrastructures such as mounds and ramparts which alter water courses and 
wildlife corridors; the movement of heavy vehicles which crush plants and animals 
and leave deep tracks in the ground; the discarding of waste food, packaging and 
shells; and brushfires resulting from gunfire. The most recent example of this 
phenomenon is the 2007 fire which raged in the Lachish region and destroyed 2,500 
hectares of land (Oren 2008). 
It should be noted that 38% of lands in reserves overlap with military training 
grounds. In the Negev, half of the areas dedicated to nature reserves are located within 
training grounds, and a third of training grounds are within nature reserves (Oren 
2008:433-7). Under Section 23 of the National Parks and Nature Reserves Law, 
security forces are freed from complying with its provisions. This may well explain 
why the military has never been particularly obstinate about the declaration of 
reserves even when the land is already utilized for training. In practice the Authority 
tries to reach a consensus with the army on the types of activities that take place, with 
tank training grounds suffering the most damage while the safety zones around the 
edges of firing ranges remain mostly unharmed (Tal 2002:197).  
It has been argued that the tracts of land that serve as a buffer between training 
grounds and civilian areas have led to the indirect protection of substantial habitats. 
While there is no direct evidence from Israel, studies from Camp Pendleton, 
California, highlight that the undeveloped shoreline has protected key habitats and 
now harbor significant biodiversity – 1250 species of plants and animals including 18 
threatened or endangered species (Machlis and Hanson 2008). Research from around 
US military bases in Germany demonstrates that training activities has contributed to 
high biodiversity by creating disturbance heterogeneity (op.cit.).  
The State Comptroller’s report (2004) identified a series of “faults, some of them 
fundamental, which point to a worrying state of affairs” with regard to the 
environmental oversight and regulation of the IDF’s activities (State Comptroller’s 
Office 2004:74). The findings identified seven problematic areas and indicate the 
degree to which the military had for years successfully dodged any meaningful 
external supervision of its environmental impacts, while leaving its internal 
mechanisms for environmental protection on a largely declarative level. These 
include: 
 
• Relations with the Ministry of Environmental Protection. There has been a 
longstanding dispute over the applicability of environmental laws to the IDF. In 
practice, almost all military activities involving hazardous materials were carried 
out without Environment Ministry permits; the Ministry was not receiving 
necessary information; and its supervision of the IDF was “marginal and rare”. 
 
• The Ministry of Security. The Ministry’s construction department was also 
responsible for supervising environmental protection, creating a potential conflict 
of interest. In addition, the Ministry’s environmental committee lacked basic 
information on IDF environmental protection activities, including the findings of 
local environmental monitoring systems and any unit or activity classified “Top 
Secret“. The committee did not follow up on the implementation of many of its 
own decisions. 
 
• The IDF’s administrative protocol: While a generic environmental policy for the 
military was established in 1999, it has not been systematically implemented by 
High Command by 2004. Potential environmental hazards had not been identified; 
protocols had not been established for responding to and investigating emergency 
pollution events and different bodies within the IDF were not sending 
representatives to the General Staff committee on environmental protection. In 
addition, the IDF was not required to report pollution events or environmental 
hazards to the Ministry of Interior Planning Directorate.  
 
• Fuel and oil pollution. IDF fuelling stations, most of them in hydrologically 
sensitive areas, operated in contravention of water regulations, lacking fuelling 
platforms, fuel separators and means for monitoring leaks. A 2001 inspection by 
the Water Commission in bases in northern Israel found dozens of cases in which 
the ground was saturated with fuels and oils, treatment platforms lacked proper 
funneling and collection, and containers were overflowing. These findings were 
discovered again in repeat inspections.  
 
• Sewage treatment. Many sewage treatment and removal facilities in the IDF are 
based on absorption pools, and only limited steps had been taken to replace these 
with sealed septic tanks or connection to the sewage system. The IDF did not 
adequately address faults found in its own inspections of evaporation pools.  
 • Two ongoing large-scale contaminations. The Ministry of Security’s treatment of 
the contamination of the Hazor aquifer by the local Air Force base, and of the 
longstanding presence of discarded ammunition on the seabed opposite Tel-Aviv’s 
beaches, was limited to an assessment of the extent and causes of contamination, 
without pursuing any particular course of action. 
 
• Investigation and enforcement. The IDF undertook a very limited number of 
actions to investigate environmental hazards caused by its units or to enforce 
environmental protection laws. A protocol approved in 2001 by the Attorney 
General concerning the enforcement of environmental laws in the IDF was not 
implemented. 
The IDF and Ministry of Security contested many of the report’s findings. 
Regarding the disputes with the Ministry of Environment, for example, the IDF 
argued that the applicability of the hazardous materials law to the army should be 
determined ad hoc for any given instance, rather than in advance for a list of various 
activities. It also argued that a comprehensive survey of environmental hazards in all 
army units would be too costly and time-consuming, and thus assessments would be 
only be carried out on a topical basis within certain units. At the same time, other 
findings were accepted: the IDF promised that fueling stations would in future be built 
according to legal requirements and existing hazards would be addressed as part of a 
multi-year plan. Six years after the report, the issue of sewage treatment remains a 
major bone of contention between the IDF and the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, with the Minister promising the IDF’s imminent agreement to treat all of 
its sewage. 
Civil Society, the IDF and the environment 
By the time that the State Comptroller’s report was released, the previously 
sacrosanct status of the military in Israeli society had already faced a number of 
important challenges. The growing environmental scrutiny of the Israeli army should 
be seen in this evolving context.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Israel experienced a certain recoil from the 
“nation in arms” model, which signaled the beginning of a demarcation between 
military and society. Indications of this trend include an escalation of public and 
media criticism of the IDF following the Sabra and Shatila massacre in Lebanon and 
human rights violations during the first Intifada; a sharp decrease in the motivation of 
Israeli youth to join the military (Spiegel 2001); cases of entire units going AWOL 
over mistreatment; and intensified public intervention of soldiers’ parents in military 
affairs, especially following the 1997 helicopter disaster, in which 73 soldiers were 
killed after two Sikorsky H3s transporting them to Lebanon collided and crashed.  
The same period also saw the shrinking of the Israeli military-industrial 
complex, previously one of the main drivers of economic growth (Mintz 1985; Mintz 
and Ward 1989). The three government-owned arms manufacturers – the Israel 
Aircraft Industries, Israel Military Industries (Ta’as) and the Weapons Development 
Authority (Rafa’el) – all saw layoffs and a shrinking in domestic and foreign 
purchasing, following the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the end of the 
Cold War, and a general trend towards subordinating the military to market 
considerations (Levi 2009). 
Shafir and Peled (2002) explain the decline of militarism as part of a deeper 
process in Israeli society. Since the Labor Party lost its political hegemony in 1977, a 
series of economic reforms by Likud and national unity government effectively ended 
the state-managed economy and nurtured the rise of an independent business class not 
beholden to the state. This, along with the Oslo Accords (initially negotiated without 
military involvement) and processes of economic and cultural globalization, led to a 
fracturing of Israeli’s once-pervasive republican ethos of citizenship, defined by an 
ideology of national unity and contribution to the “common good” (as defined by the 
ruling class). Instead, two competing discourses have emerged: a liberal-individualist 
one, inspired by consumerism and largely identified with the secular, Ashkenazi 
middle classes, which emphasizes personal rights and qualify of life; and an ethno-
nationalist one, largely identified with the Mizrachi working classes and the national-
religious population, which essentializes inclusion in society in terms of Jewishness 
and views the Arab minority as an internal enemy. 
It is within this process that the rise of mainstream Israeli environmentalism should 
be understood. Environmental contestation of military activities has primarily been 
the work of secular middle-class communities campaigning against hazards generated 
by adjacent military bases, grounded in concerns for health and quality of life. Rather 
than displaying environmental justice agendas, these campaigns have largely been a 
matter of Not-In-My-Back-Yard concerns (cf. Lake 1996). The following examples 
serve to illustrate this trend. 
 
• Ein Shemer. In 1998, residents of the Menashe regional council undertook a public 
and legal campaign against the deployment, without CSI approval, of an Arrow 
anti-ballistic missile battery in the Ein Shemer base, citing health concerns 
surrounding the system’s radar. After an appeal to the Supreme Court and 
following the intervention of the Minister of Environment, a compromise was 
reached in 2003 between the regional council and the security apparatus which 
limited the operation of the radar outside emergencies  (Oren and Regev 2008:239-
40). 
 
• IMI facilities. In the 1990s, three munitions factories belonging to the state-owned 
Israel Military Industries were closed in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Herzeliya, 
leaving behind soil contaminated with heavy metals, organic pollutants and 
explosives which also seeped into the water table. Though the IMI dragged its feet, 
heavy pressure from the public and the Ministry of Environment finally forced it to 
decontaminate the sites. In 1999, members of the Ramat Hasharon local council 
filed a class-action lawsuit against the IMI, claiming largest and still-active facility 
was contaminating the town’s drinking water. A subsequent water quality survey 
led to the closure of all the town’s wells, which was connected to Tel Aviv’s 
system. The facility was supposed to close by the end of 2010 as part of IMI’s 
privatization; residents and litigators have meanwhile managed to freeze all plans 
for high-end housing in that area until it is decontaminated (Tal 2007, Netzer 2010) 
 
• Kishon River. In 2000, a newspaper report revealed that over twenty former naval 
commando soldiers had contracted cancer, linking their illness to regular practice 
dives in the estuary of the Kishon River, which is highly polluted due to effluents 
from industries in the Haifa bay. The former elite soldiers drew on powerful social 
networks to support their public campaign, forcing the military to cease dives in 
the Kishon and set up a committee of inquiry headed by former Chief Justice Meir 
Shamgar. While the committee determined that no direct link could be established 
between the diving and the cancer incidents, the IDF nevertheless recognized the 
soldiers who had become ill or died as disabled veterans or casualties, with the 
concomitant benefits (Nathan 2007).  
 
• Atlit. In 2003, a local green NGO appealed to Haifa District Court against a 
construction project within the designated area of the Atlit naval commando base, 
located within a nature reserve (which is closed to the public due to the secrecy of 
the base). Concerned about damage to the marine environment, they initiated a 
legal process that ultimately saw the discussion returned to the CSI, where it was 
re-approved (Oren and Regev 2008:240-2). 
 
• Hoshaya. In 2003, residents of Hoshaya in the lower Galillee appealed to the 
Nazareth District Court against the construction of a new base nearby, which had 
been approved without their knowledge by the CSI in 1996. Citing damage to 
vistas, air and noise pollution, and harm to their quality of life, they also argued 
that the planned base contradicted regional development programs and demanded 
the right to view and comment on the plans. The long legal process finally reached 
the Supreme Court. While the 2006 verdict did not cancel the construction, the 
judges did express severe discomfort with the nature of military exemptions in the 
planning process, emphasizing that the “sanctity” of security concerns was a thing 
of the past and underscoring the need to balance military needs with civilian and 
environmental ones (op. cit., 242-8). 
 
• Dimona. In 2005, environmental concerns were central to opening up the debate 
over Israel’s unacknowledged nuclear facility. It was issues of pollution and safety, 
rather than weapons proliferation, that prompted the first Knesset debate on the 
topic (Melman 2005). Meanwhile, the lawsuits of over forty reactor workers who 
claim to have developed cancer following exposure to radioactive and toxic 
materials continue to be heard in the various courts (Shapira 2009, cf. Richter et al. 
1997). The reactor’s potential for decrepitude after four decades of use led to a 
series of provocative bills for its closure (Khenin et al. 2009). 
 
• The Segregation Barrier. In 2006, hundreds of Jewish settlers from the Gush 
Etzion settlements took direct action to disrupt the clearing of the Abu Suda forest, 
a nature reserve dating back to the Mandate period, where a section of the barrier 
was to be constructed. The Kfar Etzion field school then petitioned the Supreme 
Court, offering an alternative route that would spare both the forest and 50 dunams 
of Palestinians’ vineyards. The Ministry of Security accepted the new route. A year 
later, the SPNI led a parliamentary campaign against the construction of the 30km 
section of the barrier in the Judea desert, mostly within natural reserve areas. This 
led to the only documented case where a contested part of the barrier was actually 
cancelled, and replaced with a network of electronic surveillance systems (Sharon 
2007). 
 
• Tel Arad. In 2008, a television report revealed Ministry of Health data according to 
which, between 1994-2001, 17 soldiers at the Nahal Brigade training base in Tel 
Arad contracted Hodgkin's lymphoma – more than twice as other infantry brigades. 
The report noted that the base was adjacent to the city of Arad’s evaporation pools, 
which included waste from its industrial area. In response, parents of soldiers who 
were about to begin their service in the Nahal brigade launched a campaign of 
demonstrations and lobbying, demanding that the base be evacuated. Two parallel 
examinations by the IDF and the Ministry of Environment found no evidence of 
excess contamination in the training grounds. The parents rejected these findings, 
as did the IUED. Citing the precautionary principle as established by the Shamgar 
committee regarding the Kishon case, they petitioned the Supreme Court for the 
evacuation of the base. The case is still being heard (IUED 2009). 
The most recent and highly publicized case in which military plans have been 
challenged on environmental grounds is that of Training Base City (“Ir HaBahadim”), 
a project designed to transfer nine IDF training bases for non-combat units (e.g. the 
Medical Corps and Military Police) from their current locations in central Israel to a 
single site near the Negev Junction (op. cit., 181-6, 269-86, Elad 2009). The plan 
covers 1,600 dunams of land, includes 250 thousand square meters of buildings and is 
intended to house 11,000 soldiers. The project was promoted with the explicit goal of 
leveraging economic development in the Negev, creating jobs through auxiliary 
services and persuading officers’ families to relocate to the south (but see Svirsky 
2007). In addition, the relocation would allow the IDF to sell off expensive real-estate 
in the center of the country, particularly the Tzrifin base near Rishon LeZion, 
generating high revenues for the state. 
The most important consideration for choosing the Negev Junction site was that it 
had already been designated for a military base in the 1980s. Yet this location is also 
within 8 km of the Ramat Hovav industrial estate, Israel’s major center for chemical 
and pharmaceutical industries and the location of its only approved hazardous waste 
disposal site. Ramat Hovav had been a target of concern among environmentalists for 
years due to the concentration of polluting industries, a number of accidents involving 
hazardous waste, and reports of high rates of cancer and lung diseases among 
Bedouins in adjacent unrecognized villages (Almi 2003). A 2004 epidemiological 
study by Ben Gurion University, commissioned by the Ministry of Health, found that 
residential proximity to the industrial estate was associated with increased rates of 
mortality, chronic respiratory morbidity and major congenital malformations among 
the Bedouin population (Bentov et al. 2006, Karakis et al. 2008, Karakis et al. 2009).   
Citing the danger to the health of soldiers and the lack of adequate research into the 
potential hazards of the site, environmental NGOs such as the Israeli Union for 
Environmental Defense (IUED) initiated a vociferous public campaign against the 
project. In 2006, after a lengthy mediation process, the Ministry of Environment and 
representatives of the Ramat Hovav factories signed an agreement determining new 
measures for protecting air quality and a protocol for on-site treatment of their 
hazardous waste (Tal, 2006). This paved the way for a government decision 
approving the construction of Training Base City in April 2007, along with provisions 
for an epidemiological survey and the rehabilitation of the hazardous waste site – 
although these were to be completed after the base was already populated.   
Environmental groups were, nevertheless, dissatisfied with what they considered 
superficial measures.  And while bulldozers began to prepare the land for construction 
a number of demonstrations were organized by Green Course, a student 
environmental group, and parents of future conscripts. A coalition of NGOs appealed 
to the Be’er Sheva District Court, arguing that a project of such size should have been 
approved through the regular and not military planning channels, in which case a 
more comprehensive examination of environmental conditions would have been 
required. A lengthy legal process ensued, reaching the Supreme Court which required 
the state to prepare an assessment of the health risks associated with the base’s 
proximity to Ramat Hovav, and to incorporate their conclusions into the plan, which 
would be returned to the District Planning Committee and open to public scrutiny.  
The case of Training Base City, hailed as a victory by environmental NGOs, forms 
an important precedent in subordinating military planning to the same environmental 
standards required from civilian projects. Yet paradoxically, the case also indicates 
the continued force of Israeli militarism. It took a potential risk to soldiers’ health to 
lead to regulation of pollution from Ramat Hovav, whereas the existing risk to 
residents of Be’er Sheva and the Bedouin population had failed to do so for years. It is 
also worth noting that due to the prevailing winds, Be’er Sheva residents are more 
likely to be exposed to pollution than the soldiers who will be living at the training 
base. The wellbeing of the armed forces still appears to retain more weight in the 
Israeli public sphere than the wellbeing of civilians, let alone Arab citizens. 
In this context, and in closing, I would like to return to the ideological dimensions 
of Israeli militarism by looking at the IDF’s framework for internal environmental 
education. This framework clearly displays the contingent terms on which 
environmental concerns have been incorporated into the military agenda, with the 
effect of defusing their civilian and potentially anti-militarist potential. The 
framework was issues in mid-2007 by the Education and Youth Corps (Israel Defense 
Forces 2007). Alongside its relatively banal operational directives (generating of 
educational materials and lesson plans, clean-up activities, nature hikes), the true 
interest of the document lies in its construction of a “green militarism” – a seamless 
mix of environmental and patriotic sentiments which reinforces the hegemonic 
political culture of Zionist militarism, even as it brings it up to speed with 
contemporary concerns over pollution and nature protection.  
While briefly mentioning “protection of human life”, “professionalism” and 
“compliance with the law” among the values driving the program, the document’s 
detailed rationale explicitly couches environmental protection as a corollary of the 
requirement to “strengthen each soldier’s connection to the land and his love of the 
motherland. Love of the motherland strengthens each soldier’s commitment to 
protecting the State of Israel and its resources which have been entrusted to the IDF as 
a deposit” (9). Or, in the words of Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, “our duty [is] to 
educate for protection of nature, scenery, and antiquities, which are a testimony to the 
Jewish people’s heritage and its historical right to maintain a sovereign Jewish state in 
the Land of Israel”. (13) 
In summary, it can be said that although environmental agendas have made an 
important contribution to challenging Israeli militarism, the IDF has also been agile in 
adapting to these pressures and has by no means lost its privileged material and 
cultural status. If anything, the last decade has seen a fortification of militarism and 
nationalism in the wake of major hostilities in the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon, and 
a strengthening of the ethno-nationalist discourse of citizenship in Israeli society at 
the expense of the liberal-individualist one. The third option – a socialist-egalitarian 
discourse open to the universal claims of environmental justice – is only heard from a 
small minority on the radical left. Perhaps it is only with a final-status agreement with 
the Palestinians and the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict as a whole that we may 
hope for a true normalization of Israeli society; only then might environmental 
concerns finally receive the paramount place they deserve in public attention and 
policy. 
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